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IV

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant summary judgment in favor
of l)UC declaring that DUC conveyed good title in the Property to Alan Jenkins free of
claims bv Defendants, based on principles of waiver, contract, res judicata, statute of
frauds and statute of limitations.
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for
coincctness, granting no deference. It determines whether the trial court erred in applying
the|[governing law and whether it correctly held there were no disputed issues of material
fac|. Lopez v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 603 (UT 1997).
Preservation of Issue: R. 12-102, 219-258

ISSUE 2:

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing DUC's Complaint on summary

jud|ment, based on principles of res judicata, lack of standing, and judicial estoppel.
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 1 above.
Preservation of Issue: R. 102-171.

ISSUE 3: Whether the trial court erred in ignoring DUC's notion to strike evidence.
Standard of Review: Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Gallegos ex rel. Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 2004 UT
Apt 322 1^8, 9, 110P.3d710.
Preservation of Issue: R. 259-269.
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DETERMINATIVE RULES

UtahR. Civ. Proc. 56:
(c) The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. ... When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may nol Test upon the meie allegations OY denials of the pleadings, hnt the
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. NATURE OF THE CASE.
In 1986 DUC purchased a home on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City, Utah [the
Property]. Sam and Elaine Jenkins began renting the Property from DUC in 1987. A
decade later Elaine filed a Complaint for Divorce, in which she initially alleged an
ownership interest in the Property. Sam denied they had any such interest. Discovery and
litigation led to a stipulated Decree of Divorce, entered August 6, 1997, which held that
the parties held no interest in the Property. Sam died intestate less than three weeks later.
From May to August of 1997, DUC sent Elaine and Sam letters asking her to sign
a lease. Elaine refused.

After Sam's death his brother Alan Jenkins paid the family's

rent. In February of 2005 DUC sold the Property to Alan.

2

After Alan bought the Property, Elaine filed a lawsuit seeking to quiet title in the
Property in herself. In a Second Amended Complaint, Elaine named DUC but did not
allege claims against DUC. DUC filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which the Court
granted, dismissing DUC as a party. Over a year later, the Court entered a judgment that
quieted title in the Property in Elaine as against Alan Jenkins, and although no claims were
alleged against DUC and the Court had dismissed DUC as a party, against DUC as well.
Alan Jenkins appealed that action, now pending as Case No. 20070061-CA.
After learning of the judgment, DUC commenced this action, seeking a declaratory
judgment that DUC had conveyed clear title to the Property to Alan Jenkins, or alternately
voiding DUC's deed to Alan Jenkins and quieting title to the Property in DUC, or for
unjust enrichment for payments DUC made for taxes and repairs to the Property. DUC
moved for summary judgment on its first claim for relief, on the grounds that any claim
Defendants might have had to the Property was barred by waiver, contract, and res
judicata, as a result of the Jenkins' divorce decree, and based on the statute of frauds and
statute of limitations. Defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that
by virtue of the court's rulings in the 2005 lawsuit, DUC's claims in this action were
barred by res judicata and lack of standing. The Court granted Elaine Jenkins' motion for
summary judgment and denied DUC's. DUC had also filed a motion to strike portions of
Elaine Jenkins' affidavit, which the trial court failed to rule on. This appeal follows.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
2.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

DATE

EVENT

RECORD

04/16/07

DUC filed its Complaint.

R. 1-8

05/07/07

Defendants filed their Answer.

R. 8-11

08/10/07

DUC filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with
Supporting Memorandum, Declaration and Exhibits.

R. 12-102

09/14/07

Defendants filed their Memorandum in Opposition to DUCs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with Affidavit and
Exhibits.

R. 182-205

11/05/07

DUC filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Exhibit.

R. 219-258

08/10/07

Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, with
Supporting Memorandum and Exhibits.

R. 103-136

08/13/07

DUC filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

R. 137-146

08/17/07

Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.

R. 147-171

11/05/07

DUC filed its Objection to and Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit of Elaine Jenkins.

R. 259-269

11/16/07

Defendants filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
to Strike.

R. 270-277

12/13/07

Court heard oral argument on cross motions for summary
judgment.

R. 345

01/15/08

Court entered its Order on cross motions for summary
judgment.

R. 319-322

01/31/08

D. U. Company filed its Notice of Appeal.

R. 330
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Elaine Jenkins was married to Sam Jenkins. They divorced on August 6, 1997.

Sam died intestate on August 24, 1997. Alan Jenkins is Sam's brother.

The other

defendants in this action are Sam's and Elaine's children. [R. 34, 35, 69, 202, 235]
2.

On November 21, 1986, Gordon Berg by warranty deed conveyed to DUC title

to a home at 1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah (the Property). [R. 27]
3.

Sam and Elaine Jenkins began living on the Property in 1987. [R. 15]

4.

In 1996 Elaine filed a Complaint for Divorce, which alleged [R. 34-39]:
3.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on May 17, 1975

18. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired
certain real property to wit:
a.
A home located at 301 "B" Street, Rupert, Idaho 83550.
b.
It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded the
home and real property as a property settlement in lieu
of alimony.
26. Plaintiff and Defendant also have an interest in real
property located at 1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84116. The issue of adjudicating rights concerning this
property should be reserved for other independent action and the
Court should make findings that adjudication pertaining to this
property is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Any final
orders in this divorce action should not preclude the parties from
seeking their interest in this property.
5.

Sam Jenkins' divorce Answer responded as follows [R. 40-46]:
3.

Jenkins admits paragraph 3 ...

18. Jenkins admits the parties acquired real property in
Rupert, Idaho, and denies the remainder of paragraph 18. ...
26.
6.

Jenkins denies paragraph 26.

The divorce commissioner issued a Minute Entry that stated [R. 48-49]:
7.
The parties' residence is titled in the name of a
corporation ... Plaintiff claims that she and defendant actually
own the home and that she is able to continue to reside in the
5

marital residence rent free. It is proper that defendant be ordered
to fully cooperate to facilitate plaintiff and the minor children's
ability to remain in the marital residence rent free during the
pendency of this action, to the extent he is able.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
2.
That defendant be ordered to fully cooperate and do
everything necessary to insure that plaintiff and the parties' minor
children are permitted to remain in the marital residence during
the pendency of this action.

7.

Sam served an Objection to Minute Entry that stated in part [R. 52]:
4.
Jenkins objects to the second sentence [of Finding No.
7], on the grounds while Plaintiff appears to have made the claims
stated therein, those claims are without any evidentiary support,
and are knowingly false and fraudulent as to the rightful owner.
To Jenkins' actual knowledge, Plaintiff is a lessee under a verbal
rental agreement; the parties never lived in the house rent free;
and the lease is now in default and subject to termination at the
landlord's pleasure. Jenkins objects to the third sentence, on the
grounds a recommendation that he "be ordered to fully cooperate
... to the extent he is able" is so lacking in guidance as to what he
should do as to be meaningless and unenforceable. Further, to
the extent "to fully cooperate" would imply Jenkins should support
Plaintiff in pressing her meritless claim to a fee interest in the
property, or to a right to occupy the premises rent free, Jenkins
objects to any order which would require him to assist in
perpetrating a fraud on the court or attempting to defraud, or
otherwise infringe on the rights of, the rightful property owner.

8.

The parties conducted discovery regarding the Property. [R. 55-57]

9.

On May 27, 1997, before the Court ruled on Sam Jenkins' Objection to Minute

Entry, Elaine, Sam, and their attorneys executed a Stipulation and Motion for Entry of
Decree of Divorce, which provides [R. 58-62]
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho. ...
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the
course of the marriage.
19. This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendant, and resolves all issues presently
outstanding between Plaintiff and Defendant raised by the
pleadings in this matter.
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10. On August 6, 1997 the divorce court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which Elaine's and Sam's attorneys approved, that contains language
identical to the Stipulation. [R. 63-68, ^1 11-12], The court also entered a Decree of
Divorce, which Elaine's and Sam's attorneys also approved, which provides [R. 69-75]:
11. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho. ...
12 The parties acquired no other real property during the
course of the marriage.
19. This Decree resolves all outstanding issues between
Plaintiff and Defendant raised directly or indirectly by the
pleadings in this matter.

11. From May 15, 1997 to August 1, 1997 DUC sent Elaine a series of letters with
a rental agreement (lease for Elaine to sign. When Elaine refused to sign, Alan Jenkins
stepped up and paid DUC for Elaine's rent himself, and either DUC or he paid the
property taxes, so that the Jenkins family could continue to live on the Property. [R. 32,
33, 75-81, 86, 203, 240, 248-256]
12.

In February of 2005, DUC sold the Property to Alan Jenkins, who transferred

it into a family trust for the benefit of his brother's children. [R. 82, 83]
13. In 2005 Elaine Jenkins filed a Second Amended Complaint in Elaine Jenkins vs.
Alan Jenkins etal. Civil No. 050903391 (3rd District Court, Salt Lake County) (the 2005
lawsuit). Elaine alleged a claim to quiet title to the Property in her name only. The
Second Amended Complaint named DUC, but did not state a claim against DUC. [R. 8791, 104, 111-116]
14. D. U. Company served a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint against D. U.
Company. On November 29, 2005, the Court entered an Order granting DUC's Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint, and dismissing DUC as a party. [R. 92-98, 117-126]
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15. On December 27, 2006, a Judgment was entered in the 2005 lawsuit quieting
title to the Property in the name of Elaine Jenkins and, contrary to the allegations in the
pleadings, Sam Jenkins (a non-party who was dead, and who Elaine had divorced before
his death, leaving no party with standing to assert claims on behalf of Sam or his heirs),
"free and clear of any liens or claims affecting title to the [Property] by D. U. Company
or Alan Jenkins [R. 129]:
2. The Property at 1074 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City,
Utah, as more fully described below, is hereby quieted in the
name of Samuel Jenkins and Elaine Jenkins, free and clear of any
liens or claims affecting title to the foregoing property by Alan
Jenkins, individually an/or as Trustee of the A. Jenkins Trust,
Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc. or D. U. Company, Inc.

The Judgment in the 2005 lawsuit also provided [R. 129-130]:
5.
This Judgment is not intended to preclude defendants
from hereafter asserting any claim which was not required to be
raised in this action, whether as a defense to plaintiff's quiet title
action, pursuant to Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
or otherwise, that may result in a lien against the Property.

16. For purposes of DUC's Motion for Summary Judgment only, DUC did not
dispute Defendants' contention that DUC acquired the Property for the benefit of Sam and
Elaine. For purposes of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, DUC does dispute
that claim, and contends that DUC purchased the Property on its own account, and was
the legal owner free and clear of any beneficial or equitable interest of Sam or Elaine, who
at all pertinent times were mere tenants. [R. 139-141]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court erred in denying DUC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
DUC bought the Property and rented it to the Jenkins family from 1987 until it sold the
Property to Alan Jenkins in 2005. In 1987 Elaine Jenkins divorced Sam. In their divorce
action, Elaine claimed an interest in the Property, which Sam denied. The parties litigated
that issue, and ultimately stipulated to a Decree of Divorce in which they mutually agreed,
and the court adjudicated, that they had no interest in the Property. Sam died intestate
shortly after.

About the same time, DUC asserted its claim as Elaine's landlord,

repudiating any claim by Elaine to the property and triggering the statute of limitations for
Elaine to assert any claims to the Property, which she asserted for the first time in 2005
well after the limitation period had run. There is also no writing subscribed to by DUC
to support a claim by Defendants to the Property. Any claims Defendants might have had
to the Property are barred by waiver, contract, res judicata, the statute of frauds, and the
statute of limitations. The trial court erred in refusing to grant summary judgment in
DUC's favor on those grounds, and instead holding that DUC's First Claim for Relief,
which seeks a declaratory judgment that DUC conveyed good title to Alan Jenkins, is
barred by res judicata and lack of standing.
For the same reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing all of DUC's claims on
grounds of res judicata and judicial estoppel.
Elaine Jenkins offered an Affidavit in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment
that consisted largely of inadmissible statements, to which DUC objected and moved to
strike. The trial court failed to rule on DUC's objections. If this Court remands this
action for further action, it should order the trial court to rule on DUC's objections.

9

ARGUMENT

I.

1(A).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF D. U. COMPANY.

ELAINE AND SAM WAIVED ANY CLAIM TO
THE PROPERTY.
DUC is entitled to summary judgment on its First Claim for Relief, which seeks a

judgment declaring that DUC conveyed full legal and equitable title in the Property to
Alan Jenkins, free and clear of claims by Defendants.
On November 21, 1986 DUC obtained legal title to the Property, and owned the
Property until DUC conveyed it to Alan Jenkins. Sam and Elaine Jenkins, or their
children, occupied the Property since 1987, but never had legal title or other record
interest in the Property. Elaine and Sam divorced in August of 1997. As part of their
divorce, they waived any claim they may have had to the Property.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. "[Wjaiver exists where
a party has a right, knows of that right, and through its objective conduct evidences an
intent to waive that right regardless of some privately-held intention to the contrary." Vali
Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 447 fn
18 (UT App.1990) (emphasis in original).
Blaine alleged in paragraph 26 of her Complaint for divorce that Sam and she had an
interest in the Property. [R. 37] Sam knew of his right to claim an interest in the Property
when he served his Answer denying paragraph 26 of the Complaint. [R. 45] Sam's denial
was objective conduct evidencing an intent to waive any claim he may have had to the
Property. His waiver is binding on the other Defendants, who are his children, heirs and
successors in interest to any claim he may have had to the Property.
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On March 4, 1997, the divorce commissioner issued a Minute Entry: "The parties'
residence is titled in the name of a corporation ... It is proper that defendant be ordered to
fully cooperate to facilitate plaintiff and the minor children's ability to remain in the marital
residence rent free during the pendency of this action ..." [R. 48]

Sam objected: "To

Jenkins' actual knowledge, Plaintiff is a lessee under a verbal rental agreement; the parties
never lived in the house rent free; and the lease is now in default and subject to termination
at the landlord's pleasure.

... [T]o the extent 'to fully cooperate' would imply Jenkins

should support Plaintiff in pressing her meritless claim to a fee interest in the property, or
to a right to occupy the premises rent free, Jenkins objects to any order which would require
him to assist in perpetrating a fraud on the court or attempting to defraud, or otherwise
infringe on the rights of, the rightful property owner." [R. 52] Sam's objection was a
second waiver of any claim to the Property, also binding on his Defendant heirs.
Elaine and Sam later executed a Stipulation and Motion for Entry of Decree of
Divorce, in which they agreed, "During the course of the marriage the parties acquired
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho. ... The parties acquired no other real property
during the course of the marriage. ... This Stipulation ... and resolves all issues presently
outstanding between Plaintiff and Defendant raised by the pleadings in this matter." The
Findings of Fact and final Decree of Divorce, both also state, "During the course of the
marriage the parties acquired certain real property in Rupert, Idaho. ... The parties
acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage." [R. 61, 67, 73]
Elaine asserted a right to the Property both in her Complaint for Divorce [R. 371 and
in response to written discovery [R 55-56]. The Stipulation, signed by Elaine, Sam and
their attorneys, was objective conduct evidencing an intent to waive any such right. The
Court incorporated that waiver into its Findings of Fact and the Decree of Divorce. And
while Elaine alleged in her Complaint for Divorce that "The issue of adjudicating rights
concerning this property should be reserved for other independent action and the Court
11

should make findings that adjudication pertaining to this property is not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata", the Decree of Divorce, which held that Elaine and Sam had no
rights to the Property, "resolves all outstanding issues between Plaintiff and Defendant
raised directly or indirectly by the pleadings in this matter."
Waiver exists when a person through objective conduct evidences an intent to waive
a right, regardless of a contrary private intent. Vali Convalescent, supra. "[0]ne cannot
prevent a waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to waive, where his
or her actions clearly indicate such an intent." Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co.. 831
P.2d 130, 133 (UT App. 1992). The Stipulation, Finding and Conclusions, and Decree
of Divorce were an unequivocal waiver by Elaine and Sam of any claim to the Property.
There is no "ollie ollie oxen free," no "unwaiver" of a right that has been waived.
Once a right is waived, it is gone, lost, kaput. Anything Defendants may have said or
done after entry of the Decree of Divorce has no effect on the finality of the waiver, and
is irrelevant. By waiving their claims, any interest they might have had in the property
vested in the property's owner, DUC. The trial court committed reversible error by
failing to hold that Defendants (or the children's predecessor in interest) had waived any
interest they may have had in the Property.

1(B).

ELAINE AND SAM CONTRACTED AWAY ANY
CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY.
"A stipulation will be construed like other contracts ..." Year gin. Inc. v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11,1 39, 20 P.3d 287.

u

[C]ourts are bound by stipulations

between parties ... Parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the
court." First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527
(UT 1979). The Jenkins' divorce Stipulation was a contract, in which Sam and Elaine
Jenkins expressly agreed they had no interest in the Property. Any interest they may have
12

had in the Property vested in DUC as the record owner of the Property. The trial court
committed reversible error by failing to hold that Defendants (or their predecessor in
interest) had contracted away any interest they may have had in the Property.

1(C).

RES JUDICATA BARS DEFENDANTS FROM CLAIMING
THE PROPERTY.
As a result of the Decree of Divorce, Elaine, and her children as Sam's successors

in interest, are barred by res judicata from claiming an interest in the Property. See
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 191125-27, 110 P.3d
678 (citations omitted):
[R]es judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion.
In general terms, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in
a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously.
For claim preclusion to apply, three requirements must be met:
(1) [T]he subsequent action must involve the same parties, their
privies, or their assigns as the first action, (2) the claim to be barred
must have been brought or have been available in the first action, and
(3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits
of the claim.
In contrast, issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel,
"prevents parties or their privies from relitigating issues which were
once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted in a final judgment."
The four requirements of issue preclusion are as follows:
(1) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have
been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (2)
the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must
have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
1(C)(1).

Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion.

Elaine's divorce action satisfies all the elements of collateral estoppel. Elaine and
Sam Jenkins were parties. The Defendant children are in privity as Sam's successors in
interest. Whether Elaine and Sam had an interest in the Property was raised in the
13

pleadings, and again in discovery, and again in the divorce commissioner's Minute Entry
and Sam's Objection. Elaine alleged in paragraph 26 of her Complaint for Divorce [R.
37] that Sam and she had interest in the Property. Elaine's divorce action resulted in a
final judgment on the merits that resolved Elaine's claim to the Property with an order
holding that she had none. [R. 73, I t 11-12] The identical issue is raised by the pleadings
in this action.
The above facts satisfy three of the elements of collateral estoppel. The remaining
element requires that the issue in the first action must have been fairly litigated. As stated
in Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (UT App.1987):
The final element of collateral estoppel requires that the issue was
competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the first forum. This
element stems from fundamental due process and requires that
litigants have their day in court. For purposes of due process, the
parties must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise them of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
Elaine's Complaint for Divorce claimed an interest in the Property, which Sam
denied. Elaine sought a temporary order addressing the Property, to which Sam objected
on the grounds that "Plaintiff is a lessee under a verbal rental agreement; the parties never
lived in the house rent free; and the lease is now in default

... Jenkins objects to any

order which would require him to assist in perpetrating a fraud on the court or attempting
to defraud, or otherwise infringe on the rights of, the rightful property owner." Elaine and
Sam resolved the issue by stipulating that other than a parcel in Rupert, Idaho, "The
parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage.

... This

Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, and resolves
all issues presently outstanding between Plaintiff and Defendant raised by the pleadings in
this matter." The Decree of Divorce also adjudicated that Elaine and Sam had no interest
in the Property, and stated that it "resolves all outstanding issues between Plaintiff and
Defendant raised directly or indirectly by the pleadings in this matter." That provision
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stated an intent that the property issues resolved in the divorce would be final, binding, and
res judicata in any subsequent action. Elaine and Sam had their day in court. They
litigated Elaine's claim that they had a right to the Property, before resolving it by a
stipulation, made into a final judgment holding that they did not acquire any interest in the
Property. This satisfies the final element of issue preclusion, BYU v. Tremco, supra.
The trial court in this action erred by failing to hold that Defendants are precluded by
collateral estoppel from asserting an interest in the Property.
1(C)(2).

Res Judicata - Claim Preclusion.

Elaine was a party to her divorce action and this action. The other Defendants on
appeal are the successors in interest to Sam, a party to the divorce action. The effect of
the Decree of Divorce was to vest in DUC, the record owner of the Property, any interest
Elaine and Sam had in the Property, putting DUC in privity of estate. (Privity includes
a successive relationship to rights in property. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691
(UT 1978).)

Sam, the Defendant children's predecessor in interest, denied an interest

in the Property, and asserted a claim that Elaine and he had no interest in the Property
asked for relief accordingly, which the Court granted in the Decree of Divorce. These
facts satisfy the elements of claim preclusion, BYU v. Tremco, supra. The trial court
erred by denying DUC summary judgment based on res judicata/claim preclusion.

1(D).

DEFENDANTS' CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY IS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 states:
No estate or interest in real property ..., nor any trust or power over
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
by writing.
15

Defendants' claim to the Property is not based on an instrument in writing subscribed
to by DUC. Any claim Elaine Jenkins may have had to the Property based on a claim
DUC held the property in trust (other than a trust arising by operation of law) is not based
on an instrument in writing subscribed to by DUC, and is barred by the statute of frauds.
[R. 10, 182-205] Defendants did not offer any writings that would raise a genuine issue
of material fact. The trial court erred by denying DUC summary judgment based on the
statute of frauds.

1(E).

DEFENDANTS' CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY IS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A person could conceivably acquire an interest in property through a constructive

trust as an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d
147, 150 (UT 1987). Any claims Elaine might make to the Property based on theories
such as unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, misappropriation, breach
of principal-agent relation, other equitable theories, or intentional interference with
economic relations, are subject to a statute of limitations no longer than four years under
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3). Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson. 2003 UT
App3l6 1 11, 78 P.3d 616.
In 1997 DUC sent Elaine letters asserting a claim as Defendants' landlord,
repudiating any claim that DUC held the Property or for Defendants' benefit. [R. 75-81]
If DUC owed Defendants a duty, DUC's letters would have given Elaine a claim for
breach of such a duty, and triggered the statute of limitation for any such claims. The
limitation period on all such claims ran no later than 2001, and from that time forward
forever barred any such claims Elaine might have had against DUC.
In the 2005 lawsuit DUC filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. DUC argued thai
based on the facts Elaine alleged, any claims she had against DUC were time barred by
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Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25(3). That Court granted DUC's motion, ordered that Complaint
dismissed as against DUC, one of the grounds being DUC's statute of limitation argument,
and dismissed DUC as a party. That lawsuit and this one involved the same parties and
the same statute of limitation issue, which was actually litigated and resulted in a final
judgment resolving the statute of limitation issue in DUC's favor. The trial court in this
action erred by failing to grant DUC summary judgment on the grounds that any claim of
Defendants to the Property was barred by the statute of limitations, and that Defendants
were barred collateral estoppel from relitigating the statute of limitation issue.
Res judicata/claim preclusion bars not only claims that were actually litigated, but
claims that could have been litigated in the prior action. In the 2005 lawsuit Elaine could
have brought other claims against DUC, including claims for breach of duties arising out
various trust theories, agency and unjust enrichment, as well as any claim for a declaratory
judgment that DUC's deed to Alan Jenkins was subject to equitable claims by her. She
could have, but she didn't. Judge Fratto's interlocutory order dismissing all claims against
DUC and dismissing DUC as a party became final upon entry of the final judgment, which
satisfies all the elements of claim preclusion. The trial court erred in failing to grant DUC
summary judgment on this point.

1(F).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING JUDGMENT FOR
DUC ON GROUNDS OF RES JUDICATA AND STANDING.

The trial court's January 15, 2008 Order provides [R320]:
... the Court having found that D.U. Company's ("DUC's") first
claim for relief for a judgment "quieting title to the property to Alan
Jenkins" is barred by res judicata as a result of the Judgment in
Jenkins v. Jenkins, Civil No. 050903391, Third District Court (the
"2005 Lawsuit") and that DUC lacks standing to assert a claim on
behalf of Alan Jenkins ..., and for the other reasons raised at the
hearing and in the pleadings, it is hereby ordered, decreed and
adjudged as follows:
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff is denied;
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Judge Peuler stated her "other reasons raised at the hearing" were [R345, tr. pg.48]:
I'm going to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment
and deny the plaintiffs. The plaintiff seeks summary judgment only
on the first cause of action and so let me speak to that specifically.
The first cause of action seeks to have title quieted in Alan Jenkins.
As to Alan Jenkins there's no dispute but that the Fratto lawsuit is
res judicata as to any claims that Alan Jenkins has. And so with
regard to the plaintiff's first cause of action, the 2005 lawsuit
resolved any claim that Mr. Jenkins had to the property. And so for
that reason I'm going to grant the defendant's motion on the first
cause of action and deny the plaintiffs.
The trial court held DUC's First Claim for Relief was barred by res judicata as a
result of the 2005 lawsuit. It did not state whether it relied on claim preclusion or issue
preclusion, however, both branches would require DUC to have been a party to the 2005
action. While Elaine Jenkins served a Second Amended Complaint naming DUC, she did
not allege claims against DUC. DUC immediately responded with a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dismiss, which that court granted (without DUC ever having to file a responsive
pleading), stating "the Court orders the Second Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed
as against DUC, and DUC is dismissed as a party to this action. [R.92- 98]
That order dismissing DUC from the 2005 lawsuit was a judgment on the merits. See
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 41(b): "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies,
... any dismissal not provided for in this rule ... operates as an adjudication upon the
merits." The order of dismissal became final on December 27, 2006, and was not
appealed.

See R. 128, the final judgment in the 2005 lawsuit, which states "D.U.

Company, Inc. having previously dismissed from this action on a motion by D.U.
Company, Inc." Since by court order DUC was not a party to the 2005 lawsuit, it cannot
be res judicata as to DUC.
Elaine Jenkins may argue that from June 21, 2005 (the date of the Second Amended
Complaint in the 2005 lawsuit) to November 29, 2005 (the date of the trial court order
dismissing DUC as a party) DUC was a party because the Second Amended Complaint
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named DUC even though it did not allege a claim against DUC. DUC has not found find
any cases addressing that or any similar scenario, which appears to be a question of first
impression. DUC asks the Court to hold that the "same party" element of res judicata
applies only to a person who was a party at the time the issue or claim at stake was being
litigated, and at the time of final judgment. The policy justification for the requirement
that both actions must involve the same parties includes satisfying constitutional due
process, which requires that the party against whom res judicata is invoked has had his day
in court on particular claims and issues. There is no justification for giving preclusive
effect to a judgment against someone who was not there to protect its interests.
In the 2005 lawsuit, DUC obtained a final judgment on the merits that held Elaine
Jenkins did not allege claims against DUC, and dismissed DUC as a party. As a non-party
DUC had no opportunity to participate in discovery, bring pretrial motions, take part in
jury selection, make opening or closing arguments, present or object to evidence, offer
jury instructions, prepare verdict forms, bring post-trial motions, object to rulings from
the court, participate in other pretrial, trial, or post trial matters, or file an appeal. Under
the circumstances, there are no policy reasons to justify invoking res judicata against
DUC.
After the court in the 2005 lawsuit dismissed DUC as a party, it lacked jurisdiction
over DUC. "The consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to
adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant." PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, Ltd., 2000 UT App 20 f 8, 995
P.2d 1252. This trial court's denial of DUCs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
res judicata grounds amounts to a ruling that the court in the 2005 lawsuit could ignore the
constitutional rule stated in PGM, Inc. and violate DUC's rights to due process under
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
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to the United States Constitutions. Invoking res judicata against DUC based on the 2005
lawsuit would do just that.
Issue preclusion also requires that issues in the 2005 lawsuit and this action must be
identical, and that the issue in the 2005 lawsuit was competently, fully and fairly litigated
and resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The only issues in the 2005 lawsuit
involving DUC that were litigated to a final judgment were whether the Second Amended
Complaint stated claims against DUC, and whether DUC should be dismissed from the
lawsuit. The court's order dismissing all claims against DUC and dismissing DUC as a
party operates as res judicata against Elaine Jenkins, not against DUC.

1(G).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DUC'S FIRST
CLAIM WAS BARRED BY LACK OF STANDING.
The trial court erroneously denied DUC summary judgment on its First Claim for

Relief on the grounds that DUC lacks standing to assert a claim on behalf of Alan Jenkins.
The trial court's decision rests on a misreading of DUC's claim, and a misapplication of
the law dealing with a party's standing to bring a claim. DUC alleged it is entitled to a
judgment declaring its deed to Alan Jenkins conveyed full legal and equitable title in the real
property to Alan Jenkins free and clear of any and all claims by the other named defendants in this
action. The additional request to an order quieting title to the Property in Alan Jenkins is not an
essential part of DUC's claim, but naturally follows from the rest of the claim.
A party has standing to bring a claim if it has a legally protectable interest in the
claim. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20 1 12, 154 P.3d 808. DUC sold the Property to
Alan Jenkins and gave him a Special Warranty Deed, which covenants that the Property
is free from all encumbrances made by DUC, and warranted Alan 's title to the Property
against lawful claims of any person claiming by, through, or under DUC, and "that no title
defects have arisen or will arise due to the acts or omissions of the grantor." Mason v.
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Loveless, 2001 UT App 145 1f 12, 24 P.3d 997. Defendants claim that DUC bought the
Property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine, a claim that would if valid arise through or
under DUC and make DUC's warranty of title defective. DUC has standing to seek a
declaratory judgment that its deed to Alan Jenkins conveyed good title to the Property. An
additional ruling quieting title in Alan Jenkins is merely a natural consequence of the
declaratory judgment sought by DUC.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS9
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

II.

11(A).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
DUC'S FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF.

The Court's order dismissing DUC's First Claim for Relief states:
... the Court having found that D.U. Company's ("DUC's") first
claim for relief for a judgment "quieting title to the property to Alan
Jenkins" is barred by res judicata as a result of the Judgment in
Jenkins v. Jenkins, Civil No. 050903391, Third District Court (the
"2005 Lawsuit") and that DUC lacks standing to assert a claim on
behalf of Alan Jenkins ..., and for the other reasons raised at the
hearing and in the pleadings, it is hereby ordered, decreed and
adjudged as follows:
2.
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all
defendants except Alan Jenkins is granted;
3.
This matter is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice
as to all defendants except Alan Jenkins.
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on res judicata or lack of
standing for the reasons stated in point I above, incorporated here by reference.
In addition, issue preclusion requires that the issue must be identical in both actions.
BYU v. Tremco, supra % 27. The record in this action that might show what issues were
actually litigated in the 2005 lawsuit does not extend beyond DUC's Motion to Dismiss,
supporting Memorandum, and Order granting the motion [R. 92-98, 117-124], limited
parts of depositions and trial testimony [R. 28-33, 84-86, 131-136, 153-171,235-256], and
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the Judgment itself. [R. 127-129] That record does not support a conclusion that as a
matter of law any issue actually litigated in the 2005 lawsuit is identical to an issue
dispositive of DUC's claims in this action. Because Defendants did not meet their burden
of proof on this point, they are not entitled to dismissal of DUC's First Claim for Relief.

11(B).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
DUC'S SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF.

DUC's Second Claim for Relief alleged:
17. Alternatively, based on defects in the warranties of title,
of which DUC and Alan Jenkins were unaware at the time of
conveyance, DUC is entitled to a judgment voiding DUC's warranty
deed to Alan Jenkins, and quieting title to the Property in DUC, free
and clear of any and all claims by the other named defendants in this
action.
18. DUC is entitled to a money judgment against such of the
named defendants who may be shown to have been residents fo the
Property, for the unpaid fair rental value of the Property during
their periods of residence.
19. DUC is informed a Notice of Unlawful Detainer was
served on the residents of the Property by or on behalf of Alan
Jenkins. DUC is entitled to a judgment for restitution of the
premises, unpaid rent, waste, and treble damages against the
residents of the Property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.
The Court's order dismissing DUC's Second Claim for Relief states:
... the Court having found ... that DUC's second claim for relief
for a judgment "voiding DUC's warranty deed to Alan Jenkins, and
quieting title to the Property in DUC" is barred since Alan Jenkins
no longer owns the property and there is nothing to be conveyed
back by "voiding DUC's warranty deed" and also is barred by
collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel as a result of DUC's
representation to the Court in the 2005 Lawsuit that it "has no legal
or equitable interest in the Redwood Road Property," ... and for the
other reasons raised at the hearing and in the pleadings, it is hereby
ordered, decreed and adjudged as follows:
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all
defendants except Alan Jenkins is granted;
3. This matter is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice
as to all defendants except Alan Jenkins.
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DUC's Second Claim for Relief is not barred by the grounds stated by the trial court
for the reasons stated in Points I and 11(A) above, incorporated here by reference.
For purposes of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court was
obligated to accept as true that Elaine and her children were tenants who failed to pay their
rent. DUC also alleges Defendants are liable for waste. Defendants admit that Elaine did
not pay rent. It is undisputed that Alan Jenkins paid their rent for them. Defendants did
not dispute that they committed waste. Those matters all raise genuine issues of material
fact that preclude summary judgment for Defendants.
The parties did not even brief, much less analyze, judicial estoppel. [R. 12-24. 103136, 137-146, 147-171, 182-205,219-258] "The elements of judicial estoppel are: (l)the
prior and subsequent litigation involve the same parties or their privies; (2) the prior and
subsequent litigation involve the same subject matter; (3) the prior position was
'successfully maintained'; and (4) the party seeking judicial estoppel has relied upon the
prior testimony 'and changed his position by reason of it.' " Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT
2 f 11, 177 P.3d 600. The only position of DUC that it successfully maintained in the
2005 lawsuit, upon which Defendants supposedly relied, is DUC's statement in its motion
to dismiss [R. 94]:
Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief alleges, "Plaintiff is entitled
to quiet title to the Redwood Road Property in her name ..."
Plaintiff also alleges Alan Jenkins has legal title to the Redwood
Road Property and Plaintiff has equitable title to the Redwood Road
Property. DUC conveyed any interest it had in the Redwood Road
Property to Alan Jenkins, and now has no legal or equitable interest
in the Redwood Road Property. Plaintiff's quiet title action, like her
claim for injunctive relief, is between Plaintiff and Alan Jenkins and
does not involve DUC. Therefore, the Court should dismiss the
First Claim for Relief as to DUC.
Even if DUC would be collaterally estopped from claiming that DUC had an interest
in the Property after it conveyed the Property to Alan Jenkins (which DUC never claimed),
the position DUC took would not judicially estop DUC from showing there were defects
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in DUC's warranties of title of which DUC and Alan Jenkins were unaware at the time of
conveyance and that DUC is entitled to void its deed, or that DUC is entitled to a judgment
against Defendants for unpaid rent, for restitution, waste, etc. The trial court's reliance
on judicial estoppel as grounds for summary judgment against DUC was reversible error.

11(C).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
DUC'S THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF.

DUC's Third Claim for Relief alleged:
21. Alternatively, DUC paid property taxes on the Property
and paid for repairs and improvements to the Property in the good
faith belief that DUC owned the Property.
22. DUC is entitled to a judgment determining who holds
legal and equitable interests in the Property, and quieting title
accordingly.
23. The legal and/or beneficial owners of the Property have
been unjustly enriched by DUC's payment of property taxes and
payments for repairs and improvements to the Property, and have
accepted or retained the benefit under such circumstances as to make
it inequitable for them to retain the benefit without payment of its
value.
24. DUC is entitled to a judgment against the true legal and
beneficial owners of the Property for the value of the benefit DUC
conferred on them, in an amount to be determined at trial.
25. DUC is entitled to a judgment imposing a constructive
trust on the Property and proceeds thereof for the benefit of DUC.
26. DUC is entitled to a judgment imposing an equitable lien
on the Property to secure its judgment.
The Court's order dismissing DUC's Third Claim for Relief states:
... the Court having found ... that DUC's third claim for judgment
"imposing a constructive trust" or an "equitable lien" on the
property is also barred by collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel as
a result of the foregoing representation in the Second Lawsuit, and
for the other reasons raised at the hearing and in the pleadings, it is
hereby ordered, decreed and adjudged as follows:
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all
defendants except Alan Jenkins is granted;
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3.
This matter is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice
as to all defendants except Alan Jenkins.
Collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel do not bar DUC's Third Claim for Relief for
the reasons stated in Points I, 11(A) and 11(B) above, incorporated here by reference.
The trial court's ruling evinces a fundamental misapplication of res judicata to the
law of unjust enrichment. Even if the Judgment in the 2005 lawsuit was res judicata as
to DUC, that would only mean DUC could not challenge Defendants' claim to the
Property. It not preclude DUC's equitable unjust enrichment claim. Unjust enrichment
only requires proof that DUC conferred some kind of benefit on one or more of the
Defendants, that they appreciated or knew of the benefit, and that they must have accepted
or retained the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for them to retain
the benefit without payment of its value. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000
UT83 1 13, 12P.3d580.
DUC paid for property taxes, repairs and improvements to the Property in the good
faith belief that DUC owned the property. Defendants knew DUC made those payments.
If Defendants owned the property, DUC conferred a benefit on them by making those
payments, and it would be inequitable for them to keep that benefit without paying DUC
for it. There is no claim, issue, position, or representation in the 2005 lawsuit that would
preclude DUC from pursuing its unjust enrichment claim, or from obtaining an order
imposing a constructive trust or equitable lien on the property to secure payment for the
benefit. It was prejudicial error for the trial court to dismiss DUC's equitable unjust
enrichment claim based on any of the reasons the trial court gave for its ruling.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RULE ON DUC'S MOTION
TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF ELAINE JENKINS' AFFIDAVIT.
DUC objected to and moved to strike portions of the September 4, 2007 Affidavit of

Elaine Jenkins. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) requires:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. . . .
"[A]n affidavit must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts
that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein.

Statements made merely on information and belief will be

disregarded. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at
the trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit."

Walker v. Rocky Mountain

Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (UT 1973). DUC objected to and moved to parts
of the Affidavit of Elaine Jenkins as offered in violation of Rule 56(e). The trial court
ignored both the objections and DUC's motion to strike. In the event the Court remands
for further proceedings on the merits, if DUC's objections are not addressed, the
inadmissible portions of Elaine Jenkins' Affidavit would prejudice DUC. In the event of
such a remand, DUC asks this Court to order the trial court to rule on DUC's objections
and motion to strike.
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CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT

D. U. Company, Inc. respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's January
15, 2008 Order denying DUC's motion for partial summary judgment and granting
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and remand this matter to the trial court for
entry of summary judgment in favor of DUC on its First Claim for Relief. If this court
finds DUC is not entitled to summary judgment in its favor, DUC asks this Court to
reverse the trial court's order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, remand
this action for trial or other proceedings, and order the trial court to rule on DUC's
evidentiary objections.

DATED June 25, 2008.

'uyua^-e*
^—Attorney foj Appellant
V~
D. U. Company, Inc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify on June 25, 2008 copies of the above were served by first class mail to:
Russell A. Cline
Crippen & Cline L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

2476-p 110 Bnet of Appellant
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ADDENDUM

R. 34, 37

Jenkins divorce - excerpt from Complaint

R. 40, 45

Jenkins divorce - excerpt from Answer

R. 58, 61-62

Jenkins divorce - excerpt from Stipulation

R. 63, 67-68

Jenkins divorce - excerpt from Findings & Conclusions

R. 69, 73-74

Jenkins divorce - excerpt from Decree of Divorce

R. 112-116

2005 lawsuit - Second Amended Complaint

R. 93-96

2005 lawsuit - DUC's Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss

R. 98

2005 lawsuit - Order granting DUC's Motion to Dismiss

R. 128-130

2005 lawsuit - Judgment

R. 319-321

This action - Order (final judgment appealed by DUC)

R. 345

This action - Ruling at oral argument

CYNTHIA L. HAVLICEK, #7218
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: 328-8849
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

<T;

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

vs.
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,

Q/tfflfSi&f

T

Civil No
Defendant.

Judge
Commissioner

<=«.

$k/fa>~

Plaintiff by and through counsel and COMPLAINS against Defendant and alleges as
follows:

Provision Relating to tofcdiction
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are bonafideresidents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

and has been for three months immediately prior to thefilingof this action.
2.

The parties resided in the marital relationship in the State of Utah or the acts

complained of by Plaintiff were committed by Defendant in the State of Utah and therefore this

£>sL!loii- ^

Attorney's Fee?
25.

It has been necessary for Plaintiff to secure the services of an attorney to represent

the Plaintiff in this action and it is reasonable that the Defendant be required to pay the Plaintiffs
attorney's fees, in the sum of not less than $300.00, if this matter is uncontested, together with all
Court costs. In the event that the matter is contested, Defendant should pay an additional
reasonable sum as may be deemed appropriate.
Other
26.

Plaintiff and Defendant also have an interest in real property located at 1074 North

Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. The issue of adjudicating rights concerning this
property should be reserved for other independent action and the Court should makefindingsthat
adjudication pertaining to this property is not barred by the doctrine of resjudicata. Any final
orders in this divorce action should not preclude the partiesfromseeking their interest in this
property.
27.

Plaintifl has received public assistancefromthe State in the form of food stamps,

medical and day care assistance, and has assigned the right to collect child support accrued during
the time public assistance was received to the State of Utah. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code
Ana §78-45-9, (1953), as amended, the State of Utah should be joined as a party in interest in the
above-entitled cause of action.
28.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents

as are required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.

F. Mark Hansen, #5078
624 North 300 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 533-2700
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE JENKINS,

ANSWER

]
Plaintiff,

vs.
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,
Defendant.

;1
I
)

Civil No. 964905235
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner T. P. Casey

Samuel Jenkins answers the Verified Complaint as follows:
1.

Jenkins admits paragraph 1.

2.

Jenkins admits the parties resided in the marital relationship in the state of Utah and

denies all other allegations of paragraph 2.
3.

Jenkins admits paragraph 3, and avers the Protective Order referred to therein should

be set aside on the grounds it is without factual basis and was obtained as a result of Plaintiffs
knowing, vindictive, willful and maliciousfraudon the court.
4.

Jenkins admits paragraph 4, and avers as an additional grounds for divorce that

Plaintiff has engaged in a longstanding course of cruel treatment of Jenkins, causing him great
emotional distress,
5.

Jenkins admits paragraph 5.

6.

Jenkins admits paragraph 6.

7.

Jenkins admits paragraph 7.

8.

Jenkins denies paragraph 8, and avers Plaintiffs allegations regarding Jenkins are

without any factual basis whatsoever, and are knowingly false, and are a vindictive, willful and

malicious attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the court. Jenkins avers that Plaintiff is mentally,
• 1-

PxL'Lfi-U

22.

Jenkins denies paragraph 22, and affirmatively avers the Protective Order referred

to therein should be set aside on the grounds it is without factual basis and was obtained as a result
of Plaintiffs knowing, vindictive, willful and malicious fraud on the court.
23.

Jenkins denies paragraph 23, and avers that Jenkins should be entitled to claim the

tax deductions for the children; and that if Plaintiff is current in her child support and alimony
obligations the available tax deductions should be divided equally between the parties.
24.

Jenkins admits paragraph 24.

25.

Jenkins denies paragraph 25. Jenkins avers on information and belief that Plaintiff

is being represented pro bono and has incurred no attorney fees. Plaintiff is the party at fault, and
it is fair and equitable that Plaintiff should be required to pay Jenkins9 attorney fees, costs and
expenses. Alternatively, each party should bear his or her own attorney fees, costs and expenses.
26.

Jenkins denies paragraph 26.

27.

Jenkins is informed Plaintiff may have received some form of public assistance, is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether Plaintiff has assigned
any rights to third parties and therefore denies the same. Jenkins avers any issues regarding the
state of Utah are irrelevant to this action; that the state of Utah is not a party in interest to this
action; and that the state of Utah is not a necessary party under U.R.C.P. 19 or any other rule.
Jenkins denies the remainder of paragraph 27.
28.

Jenkins admits paragraph 28.

29.

Jenkins admits paragraph 29.

WHEREFORE, Jenkins prays that a divorce be granted pursuant to the terms set forth in
this Answer.
DATED t h i ^ /

day of January, 1997.

F. Mark Hansen, #5078
624 North 300 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 533-2700
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

STEPULATION AND MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 964905253
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner T. P. Casey

)

STIPULATION
The parties stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have

resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of

the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.
3.

There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine

Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie
Jenkins, born June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins,
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991.
4.

Utah is the home state of the children. There are no proceedings affecting the minor

children, or any of them, filed or pending in Juvenile Court.

1 -
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8.
(a)
(b)

(c)

Child support shall be awarded as follows:

Child support shall be awarded pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, using
actual or imputed incomes of $867.00 per month for Plaintiff and $787.00 per month for
Defendant, for a base child support award in the amount of $333.55 per month.
The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during
which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement
of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for reduction of
child support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative agency.
Normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an
interruption of the consecutive day requirement.
Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding pursuant to U.C. A. 62A-11 Parts
4 and 5.
9.

The provisions of U.C. A. sections 78-45-7.15 and -7.16 shall be incorporated and

made a part of the divorce decree.
10.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in Rupert,

Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a
properly executed deed quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu of
alimony.
11.

The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage.

12.

Defendant shall be awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools,

one set of the parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers.
Plaintiff shall be awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer. Defendant shall be awarded all
other vehicles. Plaintiff shall be awarded all other personal property.
13.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible for their own student loans,

and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from liability therefore.
14.

Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff harmlessfromliability on all other

debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred by the parties prior to their separation.
Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole responsibility of the party who incurred the
particular debt or obligation.
15.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax returns for 1995 and 1996.
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16.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for the parties' minor

children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is current in his child support
obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the personal exemptions for the
minor children on his income tax return.
17.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs.

18.

Each party shall execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required to

implement this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce.
19.

This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, and

resolves all issues presently outstanding between Plaintiff and Defendant raised by the pleadings in
this matter.

MOTION
Elaine Jenkins, Samuel Jenkins, the Guardian ad Litem and Utah Department of Human
Services agree to the above Stipulation, and jointly move the Court to enter a Decree of Divorce
incorporating the terms of the Stipulation.
DATED this £j_

day of May, 1997.

Elaine Jenki

T£DJi:!M/
Attorney for Elatofc Jenkins

Utah Department of Human Services

»

Assistant Attorney General

2162p.008
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F. Mark Hansen, #5078
624 North 300 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 533-2700
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,
Defendant.

i
;>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i
)
)

Civil No. 964905253
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner T. P. Casey

;

The parties having stipulated to the terms of a Decree of Divorce and having moved the
Court to enter a Decree of Divorce incorporating the terms of the stipulation, the Court having
reviewed the terms of the stipulation and finding those terms reasonable, and being fully informed,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have

resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of

the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.
3.

There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine

Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie
Jenkins, bora June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins,
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991.

- 1-
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10.

It is fair and reasonable that each parent shall share equally the reasonable work-

related child care expenses of the parents. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent
shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child
care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making
monthly payments of that expense while it is not being incurred. A parent who incurs child care
expense shall provide written verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the
other parent upon initial engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent.
The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense
of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change. A parent incurring child care
expenses shall forfeit the right to receive credit for and to recover to other parent's share of the
expenses if he or she fails to comply with the notice requirements of this paragraph.
11.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in

Rupert, Idaho. It is fair and reasonable that immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce
Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a properly executed deed quitclaiming his interest in the real
property in lieu of alimony.
12.

The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage.

13.

It is fair and reasonable that the parties1 personal property be divided as follows:

Defendant is awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools, one set of the
parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers. Plaintiff is
awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer. Defendant is awarded all other vehicles. Plaintiff
is awarded ail other personal property.
14.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible

for their own student loans, and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from
liability therefore.
15.

It is fair and reasonable that Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff

harmless from liability on all other debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred
- 5 -

by the parties prior to their separation. Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole
responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt or obligation.
16.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax

returns for 1995 and 1996.
17.

It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption

for the parties' minor children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is
current in his child support obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the
personal exemptions for the minor children on his income tax return.
18.

It is fair and reasonable that each party be responsible for his or her own attorney

fees and costs.
19.

It is fair and reasonable that each party shall execute and deliver to the other such

documents as are required to implement this Decree of Divorce.
The Court concludes it is fair, reasonable, proper and in accordance with law that the Court
enter a Decree of Divorce in accordance with the parties' stipulation and the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law
DATED this J ^ d a yy of May, W97.
Reconuaeodcd by

77//

0 ^

BY THE COURT:

Q^S^S

Mr

wSkCuep^
District Court Commissioner
APPROVED AS TO FORM

District Court Judge

Vttoftiey for Elaine Jenkins

2162pOlO
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Third.iMdiciai District

F. Mark Hansen, #5078
624 North 300 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 533-2700
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins

AUG 6 «97

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DECREE OF DIVORCE

ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 964905253
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner T. P. Casey

The parties having stipulated to the terms of a Decree of Divorce and having moved the
Court to enter a Decree of Divorce incorporating the terms of the stipulation, the Court having
reviewed the terms of the stipulation andfindingthose terms reasonable, and being fully informed,
hereby enters the following Decree of Divorce. The Court orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have

resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to thefilingof this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of

the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.
3.

There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine

Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie
Jenkins, born June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins,
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991.
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thereafter on or before January 2 of each calender year. The parent shall also notify the other
parent of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 days of the date he or she
first knew or should have known of the change. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within
30 days of payments. A parent incurring medical expenses shall forfeit the right to receive credit
for and to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if he or she fails to comply with the
notice requirements of this paragraph.
10.

Each parent shall share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses of

the parents. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin paying his share on
a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense, but if the child
care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payments of that
expense while it is not being incurred. A parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written
verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall notify
the other parent of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within
30 calendar days of the date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses shall forfeit the
right to receive credit for and to recover to other parent's share of the expenses if he or she fails to
comply with the notice requirements of this paragraph.
11.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in

Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce Defendant shall execute and
deliver to Plaintiff a deed quitclaiming his interest in the real property in lieu of alimony.
12.

The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage.

13.

The parties have acquired certain items of personal property, which shall be divided

as follows: Defendant is awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools, one
set of the parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers.
Plaintiff is awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer. Defendant is awarded all other vehicles.
Plaintiff is awarded all other personal property.
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14.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible for their own student loans,

and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from liability therefore.
15.

Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff harmless from liability on all

other debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred by the parties prior to their
separation. Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole responsibility of the party who
incurred the particular debt or obligation.
16.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax returns for 1995 and 1996.

17.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for the parties' minor

children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is current in his child
support obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the personal exemptions
for the minor children on his income tax return.
18.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs,

19.

This Decree resolves all outstanding issues between Plaintiff and Defendant raised

directly or indirectly by the pleadings in this matter.
20.

Each party shall execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required to

implement this Decree of Divorce.

2$**:

DATED this
y of May, 1997.
Recommended

T; Patrick Cwey/
District Court

BY THE COURT:

k^i.

mi

"jner

Guardian ad Litem

Assistant Attorney General
2162p.0O8

Russell A. Cline (4298)
Crippen & Cline L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
File No. 205009.01

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE JENKINS
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

:

CrVTLNO. 050903391
JUDGE: Fratto

ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U.
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC.,
Defendants.

For complaint against Defendant, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
1.

Elaine Jenkins is an individual residing in Salt Lake County.

2.

Alan Jenkins, trustee ("Alan Jenkins") is an individual residing in Salt Lake County.

3.

D.U. Company, Inc. ("DU") is a Utah corporation.

4.

Davis County Cooperative Society Inc. (the "Cooperative") is a Utah corporation.

5.

For many years Elaine Jenkins and her husband Sam Jenkins (collectively, the

"Jenkins") were members of a polygamist group, sometimes known as the "Kingston Group."
6.

The members of the polygamist group also belonged to the Cooperative

7.

Members of the Cooperative worked for Cooperative owned business and received

"credits" on a ledgers maintained by the Cooperative for work performed.
8.

Members of the Cooperative were then entitled to obtain goods, services and property

from the Cooperative and from Cooperative owned businesses by writing "script," which was then
deducted from the ledger of the member receiving the goods, service or property.
9.

Beginning in the early 1960's, the Jenkins began working within the Cooperative.

10.

Until 1988, the Jenkins lived in a house in Woods Cross, Utah (the "Woods Cross

Property")
11.

As the Jenkins worked for the Cooperative, they received credits against their ledger

for goods, services and property they received.
12.

By 1988, the Jenkins had fully paid for the Woods Cross Property, based on

• deductions from credits earned through the Cooperative.
13.

Although the Jenkins owned the Woods Cross Property, it was titled in the name of

D.U., a company controlled by the Cooperative and/or the Kingston Group.
14.

By 1988, the Jenkins wanted to move closer to Salt Lake City.

15.

The Cooperative approved purchase of a house located at 1074 North Redwood Road,

Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Redwood Road Property.")
16.

The negotiated purchase price (which was negotiated by the Jenkins) was $50,000.

17.

The Cooperative agreed to transfer the Jenkins' $40,000 in equity from the Woods
2

Cross Property to the Redwood Road Property.
18.

Elaine Jenkins' mother-in-law, Merilynn Jenkins, agreed to have her ledger debited

by $10,000 to make up the difference.
19.

At the time of its purchase, the Redwood Road Property was completely paid for by

the Jenkins.
20.

The Redwood Road Property was titled in D.U.

21.

Thereafter, property taxes that were paid on the Redwood Road Property were

deducted from the Jenkins ledger.
22.

Although the Property was titled in the name of D.U., the Jenkins were always

assured that it was "their house."
23.

Documents maintained by the Cooperative list the Redwood Road Property as

property belonging to the Jenkins.
24.

In 1998, Sam Jenkins died.

25.

Around the time of Sam Jenkins death, Elaine Jenkins publicly separated herself from

the polygamist group.
26.

At the time of Sam Jenkins5 death, Elaine Jenkins asked the Cooperative regarding

the balance on the Jenkins ledger, which was believed to be in excess of $6,000.
27.

The Cooperative told Elaine Jenkins that the credits on account for the Jenkins would

be used to continue to pay property taxes on the Property.
28.

Sometime thereafter, the Cooperative demanded that Elaine Jenkins leave the

Redwood Road Property.
3

29.

Elaine Jenkins refused to do so, stating that the Redwood Road Property was hers.

30.

The Cooperative made no further claim to the house until recently.

31.

On February 8, 2005, the Redwood Road Property was transferred into the name

"Alan Jenkins, trustee."
32.

Alan Jenkins is a member of the Kingston Group.

33.

On February 11,2005, Alan Jenkins served Elaine Jenkins and her family with a 5-

day Notice to Quit.
34.

Alan Jenkins then indirectly informed Elaine Jenkins that in the event they did not

vacate the Redwood Road Property, a "crew" would come forcibly evict her from the Redwood Road
Property on Monday, February 21,2005.
CLAIM I
(Quiet Title)
3 5.

The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

36.

Plaintiff is entitled to quiet title to the Redwood Road Property in her name, under

theories of constructive trust, resulting trust, adverse possession, misrepresentation, waiver, estoppel,
fraud and/or other equitable principals.
CLAIM H
(Damages)
37.

The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

3 8.

Plaintiff is entitled to such damages as shall be proved at trial, including damages for

unjust enrichment, misrepresentations, fraud, breach of contract and/or other theories under which
plaintiff is entitled to damages for the value of the Redwood Road Property.

4

CLAMm
(Injunctive Relief)
3y.

The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

40.

Jenkins is entitled to injunctive relief, enjoining defendant or any individual acting

under defendant's direction, from removing plaintiff and her family from the Redwood Road
Property or otherwise trespassing on the Redwood Road Property.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief against defendants as follows:
1.

An order quieting title to the Redwood Road Property in plaintiffs name;

2.

Such damages as shall be proved at trial;

3.

Reasonable costs and attorney's fees.

4.

Such further relief as the court may grant.

DATED this J~]

day of June, 2005.

/

/

MA;

/M&SIELL A. CLME
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F. Mark Hansen, Utah Bar No. 5078
F. Mark Hansen, P.C.
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431 North 1300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

By.

Telephone: (801) 517-3530
Attorney for D. U. Company
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ELAINE JENKINS,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST D. U. COMPANY

Plaintiff,
vs.

ALAN JENKINS; D. U. COMIPANY,
INC.; DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE
SOCIETY, INC.
Defendants.

Civil No. 050903391
Judge Joseph C. Fratto

D. U. Company (DUC) respectfully submits this memorandum in support of its motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint against DUC.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION AGAINST DUC.
Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief alleges, "Jenkins is entitled to injunctive relief, enjoining

defendant or any individual acting under defendant's direction, from removing plaintiff and her
family from the Redwood Road Property or otherwise trespassing on the Redwood Road Property."
The Third Claim for Relief refers to only one "defendant" in the singular. According to the
Complaint, it is Alan Jenkins who seeks to evict Plaintiff from the Redwood Road Property. The
Complaint does not allege DUC has ever interfered, or attempted or threatened to interfere, with
Plaintiffs quiet enjoyment of the property. Injunctions are available only upon a showing of
irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law. System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon,
669 P.2d 421, 425-27 (Utah 1983).

Because Plaintiff does not allege DUC is causing or

threatening Plaintiff with irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law, Plaintiffs
claim for injunctive should be dismissed as to DUC for failing to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted against DUC.

IL DUC IS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S QUIET TITLE CLAIM.
Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief alleges, "Plaintiff is entitled to quiet title to the Redwood
Road Property in her name ..." Plaintiff also alleges Alan Jenkins has legal title to the Redwood
Road Property and Plaintiff has equitable title to the Redwood Road Property. DUC conveyed any
interest it had in the Redwood Road Property to Alan Jenkins, and now has no legal or equitable
interest in the Redwood Road Property. Plaintiffs quiet title action, like her claim for injunctive
relief, is between Plaintiff and Alan Jenkins and does not involve DUC. Therefore, the Court
should dismiss the First Claim for Relief as to DUC.

III.

THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST DUC,
Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief alleges, "Plaintiff is entitled to such damages as shall

be proved at trial, including damages for unjust enrichment, misrepresentations, fraud, breach of
contract and/or other theories under which plaintiff is entitled to damages for the value of the
Redwood Road Property." Plaintiff had failed to state a claim for damages against DUC.
A,

Unjust Enrichment.
Unjust enrichment requires three elements. First, one person must confer a benefit on

another. Second, the conferee must appreciate or know of the benefit. Finally, the conferee must
accept or retain the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable not to pay its value. Groberg
v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67 S 21, 68 P.3d 1015. Plaintiff does not allege
unjust enrichment against DUC. Plaintiff alleges Sam Jenkins and his mother conferred a benefit
on Davis County Cooperative Society. Plaintiff does not allege that she conferred a benefit on
DUC, or that DUC appreciated or knew of a benefit Plaintiff conferred on DUC, or that DUC
accepted or retained any such benefit under circumstances making it inequitable for DUC to retain
the benefit without paying its value. Also, unjust enrichment claims are subject to a four year
statute of limitation, U.C.A. §78-12-25(3). Russell/Packard Dev. Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App
316 111, 78 P.3d 616. Plaintiff alleges a benefit was conferred before Sam Jenkins* deatli some

1

Plaintiff divorced Sam Jenkins; their Decree of Divorce wasentered in spring of 1997. Sam Jenkins
actually passed away on August 24, 1997, not in 1998. These facts are of record in Elaine Jenkins v.
Samuel Jenkins, civil no. 964905235 (Utah 3rd. Dist. Ct.), of which the Court may take judicial notice.
Utah R. Evidence 201; Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc.. 2003 UT App 41 l//i 2,82 P.3d 198.
-
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seven years before Plaintiff commenced this action. Therefore, based on Plaintiffs allegations her
unjust enrichment claim is time-barred.
B.

Fraud/Misrepresentation.
"To bring a claim sounding in fraud, a party must allege (1) that a representation was made

(2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon
it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely
upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage." Semenov v. HilL
1999 UT 58 1 9, 982 P.2d 578.
The circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity. Utah R. Civ. Proc.
9(b). A Plaintiff claiming fraud must allege "the relevant surrounding facts ... with sufficient
particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Coroles v. Sabey,
2003 UT App. 339 % 22, 79 P.3d 974. "The objective of these rules is to require that the essential
facts upon which redress is sought be set forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty so that
it can be determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed; and, if so, so that there
will be a clearly defined foundation upon which further proceedings by way of responsive pleadings
and/or trial can go forward in an orderly manner." Id. at S 23. "It is Plaintiffs' responsibility, not
the courts*, to set forth the relevant surrounding facts" in such a manner that it is evident what facts
are claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Id. at ^ 27.
A Plaintiff who uses the passive voice, "failing to identify exactly who made the alleged
misrepresentations," does not plead "material misrepresentations" with particularity. Id. at % 28.
In Coroles, the Plaintiffs alleged they "were falsely told that professional golfers ... were
substantial investors ... Without any indication of who made this statement to them, however, we
can hardly conclude that Plaintiffs have pleaded this allegation with particularity. Certainly one
requirement for pleading fraud with particularity is to identify the offender." id. In this action,
Plaintiffs allegations suffer the same infirmity. Plaintiff alleges "The Cooperative agreed ...";
"The Jenkins were always assured ..."; "the Cooperative told Elaine Jenkins ..."; "the Cooperative
demanded ..."; etc. Plaintiff has not indicated any particular person as having made any particular
statement to Plaintiff. In particular, Plaintiff has not alleged with particularity that DUC made any
:

-

3
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specific representation to Plaintiff, yet alone one that was material and knowingly false, or that
DUC did anything to satisfy the other elements of fraud. As a matter of law, Plaintiff has not
alleged circumstances constituting fraud by DUC with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b).
C.

Breach of Contract.
Plaintiff has not alleged DUC and Plaintiff were parties to any contract, or the terms of any

alleged contract between DUC and Plaintiff, or that DUC breached any contractual duty to Plaintiff,
or that Plaintiff was injured by any breach of any contract between Plaintiff and DUC. Therefore,
as a matter of law Plaintiff has not stated a claim against DUC for breach of contract.
D.

Damages.
While Plaintiff alleged she "is entitled to such damages as shall be proved at trial," she has

not alleged DUC caused her damages under any legal theory. Since Plaintiff has not alleged that
DUC caused Plaintiff damages, she fails to state a claim for damages against DUC.
E.

"Other Theories".
To allege that a party is liable on "other theories," without identifying what the "other

theories" may be, and without identifying facts upon which the Court could award damages for
"other theories," fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against DUC.

CONCLUSION
Based on the above, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the Court should dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint against DUC on the grounds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against DUC.

DATED October 21, 2005.
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F. Mark Hansen, P.C.
431 North 1300 West
Salt Lake City, UT84U6
Telephone: (801) 517-3530
Attorney for D. U. Company
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT AGAINST D.
U. COMPANY

ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALAN JENKINS; D. U. COMIPANY,
INC.; DAVIS COUNTY COOPERATIVE
SOCIETY, INC.
I

Defendants.

Civil No. 050903391
Judge Joseph C. Fratto

D. U. Company (DUC) having moved the Court pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6)
to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint against DUC for failing to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against DUC, the motion being unopposed, the Court having considered the
motion and good cause appearing, the Court orders the Second Amended Complaint is hereby
dismissed as against DUC, and DUC is dismissed as a party to this action.

DATED November

2005.

BY THE,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify on November 17, 2005 copies of the above were served by first class mail to:
Russell A. Cline
Crippen & Cline L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Carl E. Kingston
3212 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Attorney for Alan Jenkins
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE JENKINS
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
CIVIL NO. 050903391
JUDGE: Fratto

vs.

ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U.
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC.,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court for jury trial on October 11,12, and 13,2006, and
plaintiff being represented by Russell A. Cline and defendants Alan Jenkins, Trustee, and Davis
County Cooperative Society, Inc. being represented by Carl Kingston, and D.U. Company, Inc.
I
having previously been dismissed from this action on a motion by D.U. Company, Inc., and the jury
having made its findings in this matter pursuant to a Special Verdict, and good cause appearing, it
is hereby ordered, decreed and adjudged as follows:

Judgment @J

050903391

.....

JD20920160
JENKINS.ALAN

1.

All of plaintiff s claims in the consolidated action of Alan Jenkins, Trustee vs. Elaine

Jenkins, Loren Jenkins, Stanley Jenkins and Jeremiah Jenkins, Civil No. 050904099, including all
claims for payment of rent, are hereby dismissed on the merits and with prejudice.
2.

The property at 1074 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, as more folly described

below, is hereby quieted in the name of Samuel Jenkins and Elaine Jenkins, free and clear of any
liens or claims affecting title to the foregoing property by Alan Jenkins, individually and/or as
Trustee of the A. Jenkins Trust, Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc. or D.U. Company, Inc.
3.

The property referenced in paragraph 2 is the following property located in S alt Lake

County, Utah:
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2099 ft and 75 ft East
from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Sec 27, T IN, R1W,
SLB&M; thence South 0°20! West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence
North 0°20' East 60 ft; thence West 130 ft to the pont of beginning,
cont. 0.18 acres.
ALSO
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2039 ft and 75 ft East
from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W,
SLB&M; thence South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence
North 0°20f Easi 60 ft; thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning,
cont. 0.18 acres.
Parcel No. 08-27-251-011
4.

Plaintiff is awarded costs against defendants Alan Jenkins and Davis County

Cooperative Society, Inc. in the amount of $875.04.
5.

This Judgment is not intended to preclude defendants from hereafter asserting any

claim which was not required to be raised in this action, whether as a defense to plaintiffs quiet title

2

action, pursuant to Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise, that may result in a
lien against the Property.
DATED this 01

day of December, 2006.

Approved as to form:

'

sf~ ster H^s
Carl Kingston

^
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Russell A. Cline (4298)
Crippen & Cline L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
Attorneys for all defendants except Alan Jenkins

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

D.U. COMPANY, INC.,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 070905604
JUDGE: Peuler

vs.

ALAN JENKTNS; ELAINE JENKTNS;
JENNIFER ELAINE JENKINS; JOSEPH
WILLIAM JENKTNS, Estate of ROSE
MARIE JENKINS; CHARLES ISREAL
JENKINS; STANLEY WALLACE
JENKINS; SAMUEL LORTN JENKINS;
REBECCAH RACHELLE JENKINS;
JESSE TAYLOR JENKINS; DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment by plaintiff and the Motion for Summary Judgment by
all defendants except Alan Jenkins having come before the Court for hearing at 2:00 p.m. on
December 13,2007, and plaintiff having been represented by Mark Hansen and all defendants except

Alan Jenkins having been represented by Russell A. Cline, and Alan Jenkins having not been served
in this matter and having not appeared at the hearing, and the Court having found that D.U.
Company's ("DUC's") first claim for relief for a judgment "quieting title to the property to Alan
Jenkins" is barred by res judicata as a result of the Judgment in Jenkins v. Jenkins, Civil No.
050903391, Third District Court (the "2005 Lawsuit") and that DUC lacks standing to assert a claim
on behalf of Alan Jenkins, and that DUC's second claim for relief for a judgment "voiding DUC's
warranty deed to Alan Jenkins, and quieting title to the Property in DUC" is barred since Alan
Jenkins no longer owns the property and there is nothing to be conveyed back by "voiding DUC's
warranty deed" and also is barred by collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel as a result of DUC's
representation to the Court in the 2005 Lawsuit that it "has no legal or equitable interest in the
Redwood Road Property," and that DUC's third claim for judgment "imposing a constructive trust"
or an "equitable lien" on the property is also barred by collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel as
a result of the foregoing representation in the Second Lawsuit, and for the other reasons raised at the
hearing and in the pleadings, it is hereby ordered, decreed and adjudged as follows:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff is denied;

2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all defendants except Alan Jenkins is

granted;
3.

This matter is dismissed on the merits and with prejudice as to all defendants except

Alan Jenkins.

2

DATED this / 6~ day of January, 2008.

B f THE COURT

Approved as to form:

Mark Hansen
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With Keyword Index

CROSS SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DECEMBER13, 2007
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

F. MARK HANSEN
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

RUSSELL A. CLINE
Attorney at Law

Oral Arguments
Mr. Hansen
Mr. Cline
Ruling

Page
8, 47
2, 40
49

1

(inaudible).

I would submit it on that basis.

2

THE COURT: Thanks.

3

MR. HANSEN: Thank you.

4

THE COURT: Thanks both you, counsel, for answering

5

all of my questions today.

6

but I think I'm ready to rule.

7

ruling if I could.

8

This is a very interesting case
And let me go through my

I'm going to grant the defendant's motion for

9

summary judgment and deny the plaintiffs. The plaintiff seeks

10

summary judgment only on the first cause of action and so let

11

me speak to that specifically.

12

The first cause of action seeks to have title

13

quieted in Alan Jenkins.

14

dispute but that the Fratto lawsuit is res judicata as to any

15

claims that Alan Jenkins has.

16

plaintiff's first cause of action, the 2005 lawsuit resolved

17

any claim that Mr. Jenkins had to the property.

18

that reason I'm going to grant the defendant's motion on the

19

first cause of action and deny the plaintiffs.

20

As to Alan Jenkins there's no

And so with regard to the

And so for

On the second cause of action, I'm granting the

21

defendant's motion on all three causes of action, but let me

22

be specific about the other two.

23

The second cause of action that the plaintiff seeks

24

is to have their warranty deed voided and have title

25

transferred back to them. Again, Alan Jenkins lost in the
49

1

Fratto lawsuit and there is nothing that he has to convey

2

back to DU Company. And so that issue has been fully

3

litigated in the Fratto lawsuit - and I apologize, we

4

probably shouldn't call it the Fratto lawsuit - in the 2005

5

lawsuit in which Judge Fratto was assigned, and there is

6

nothing to litigate at this time.

7

As to the third cause of action which seeks

8

equitable remedies, the plaintiff in this case, DU Company,

9

was brought into the 2005 lawsuit which was an action to

10

quiet title in Ms. Jenkins.

11

DU, named them as a party, tried to litigate the quiet title

12

action with them and DU Company opted out by claiming that

13

they had no legal or equitable interest in the property.

14

don't think they can change their position at this point.

15

They said they had no legal or equitable interest and they

16

cannot claim that now.

17

dismissed out of the lawsuit and I think that's clear.

18

So, Ms. Jenkins tried to include

I

That was the basis for them being

DU claims that it is not bound by 2005 judgment.

19

That is not for me to determine.

20

appellate authority over Judge Fratto or the verdict form or

21

the judgment that was entered. What I have is the judgment

22

that purports to bind both Mr. Jenkins and DU Company and I

23

think I'm obligated to recognize that.

24
25

I am not - I don't have any

Even if DU Company were to succeed on its claims
that it is not bound by that lawsuit, I don't think this is
50

the proper way in which to frame its issues.

I think DU

Company would have to move to set aside the judgment by
saying it's not bound by the 2005 judgment or ask Judge
Fratto to let them be included as a party so they can
litigate the issues in that case, or alternatively, wait and
let Mr. Alan Jenkins sue them and then they can litigate the
issue of the warranty deed and any issues surrounding the
warranty deed,

I don't think this is the proper vehicle to

do what they're claiming that they ought to be entitled to do
because they had an opportunity to raise all of these issues
in the prior lawsuit.

They were brought in as a party.

They

got out by saying they didn't have any interest in the
property.
say,

I think it's disingenuous to come back in now and

xv

We get to litigate this because we weren't a party

then."
They were a party and they got out because they
said they had no interest.

So, I think they're bound by that

statement of no legal or equitable interest in the 2005
lawsuit.

That's kind of the bottom line for me and I

understand there is some disagreement with that but that's
the basis for my ruling.
Any questions?
MR. HANSEN: No questions.
THE COURT: Mr. Cline will you prepare an order?
MR. CLINE: I will, Your Honor.
51

THE COURT: And you can briefer than I was but
prepare an order consistent with my ruling.
MR. CLINE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thanks to you both, counsel, for your
appearances today.

We'll be in recess.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

